Fowers et al. (2017)recently made a general argument for virtues as the characteristics necessary for individuals to flourish, given inherent human limitations. For example, people can flourish by developing the virtue of friendship as they navigate the inherent (healthy) human dependency on others. This general argument also illuminates a pathway to flourishing during the COVID-19 pandemic, the risks of which have induced powerful fears, exacerbated injustices, and rendered life and death decisions far more common. Contexts of risk and fear call (...) for the virtue of courage. Courage has emerged more powerfully as a central virtue among medical personnel, first responders, and essential workers. Longstanding inequalities have been highlighted during the pandemic, calling for the virtue of justice. When important personal and public health decisions must be made, the central virtue of practical wisdom comes to the fore. Wise decisions and actions incorporate the recognition of relevant moral concerns and aims, as well as responding in fitting and practical ways to the specifics of the situation. Practicing courage, justice, and practical wisdom illuminates a path to flourishing, even in a pandemic. (shrink)

Virtue-based ethics prioritizes _phronesis_ (practical wisdom) because, as rules have become less action-guiding, good judgment (_phronesis_) becomes more necessary as a guiding meta-virtue. The view of _phronesis_ that MacIntyre proposed in _After Virtue_ (hereafter, AV _phronesis_) has been applied in medical ethics despite his substantial deviations from his source (Aristotle) in _After Virtue_. In this paper, we clarify the differences between the neo-Aristotelian and AV _phronesis_ views and argue for a neo-Aristotelian _phronesis_ with four functions (constitutive, adjudicative, emotion regulative, and (...) blueprint). In referring to neo-Aristotelians, we refer to the recent scholars that who hark back strongly to Aristotle and have amended some of Aristotle’s less palatable views by adding insights from current empirical science to the domains that he left vague. Then we discuss how AV _phronesis_ and neo-Aristotelian _phronesis_ differ, focusing on the distinction between technical (i.e., alterable means toward patient health such as medication choices) and _phronetic_ (i.e., actions that are inseparable from patient health) actions in medicine. This distinction is understated in AV _phronesis_, but central to neo-Aristotelian _phronesis_. Accordingly, the neo-Aristotelian approach makes an important and unique contribution to physician ethical development. (shrink)

Ivancovsky et al. propose a novelty-seeking model linking curiosity to creativity. This commentary suggests integrating their work with a stage-based creativity model for additional insights. It also encourages readers to address knowledge gaps identified by the authors, including factors that trigger the pursuit of creative solutions. We aim to refine theory and direct future research to clarify the complex curiosity–creativity relationship.

Philosophers provide excellent resources for developing a science of virtues, and an interdisciplinary collaboration between philosophers and psychologists seems ideal. This suggestion is not new, but there has been little guidance for psychologists about how philosophical work can be useful in developing a science of virtue. This article provides some guidance by dividing the contributions of philosophers into three categories. First, many philosophers provide theories of virtue’s nature or value, but these are generally not useful for psychological scientists and can (...) be safely ignored. Second, awareness of the range of philosophic positions can enable scientists to recognize contentious theoretical assumptions that they are making. Psychologists need not try to resolve these debates; they can choose to only identify which position(s) they are taking. Third, awareness of the range of philosophic positions and the competing conceptual analyses of various virtue concepts and traits can help psychologists to identify and test new empirical hypotheses. (shrink)

Best known for reviving the tradition of classical liberalism, F. A. Hayek was also a prominent scholar of the philosopher John Stuart Mill. One of his greatest undertakings was a collection of Mill’s extensive correspondence with his longstanding friend and later companion and wife, Harriet Taylor-Mill. Hayek first published the Mill-Taylor correspondence in 1951, and his edition soon became required reading for any study of the nineteenth-century foundations of liberalism. This latest addition to the University of Chicago Press’s Collected Works (...) of F. A. Hayek series showcases the fascinating intersections between two of the most prominent thinkers from two successive centuries. Hayek situates Mill within the complex social and intellectual milieu of nineteenth-century Europe—as well as within twentieth-century debates on socialism and planning—and uncovers the influence of Taylor-Mill on Mill’s political economy. The volume features the Mill-Taylor correspondence and brings together for the first time Hayek’s related writings, which were widely credited with beginning a new era of Mill scholarship. (shrink)

An adamant fan of Darwin, F.W. Headley attempts to argue the difficulties of believing in Socialism and Darwinism simultaneously and highlights issues which could prevent Socialism from being put into practice. Originally published in 1909, this study uses examples of communities in countries such as England and India to illustrate Headley’s key belief that societies only function well if they do not interfere with the fight for existence and natural selection. This title will be of interest to students of Philosophy, (...) Sociology and Anthropology. (shrink)

V nastoi︠a︡shchem izdanii raskryvaetsi︠a︡ biografii︠a︡, a takzhe publikuetsi︠a︡ znachitelʹnai︠a︡ chastʹ ėpistoli︠a︡rnogo nasledii︠a︡ poluzabytogo filosofa Adolʹfa Markovicha Lazareva (1872-1944), odnogo iz blizhaĭshikh druzeĭ, edinomyshlennika i uchenika Lʹva Shestova, istolkovateli︠a︡ ego filosofskikh ideĭ. V knigu vkli︠u︡cheny takzhe statʹi A. Lazareva o L. Shestove -- kak opublikovannye, tak i neizvestnye, sokhranivshiesi︠a︡ v ego arkhive. Prinadlezha k t.n. "shestovskomu" krugu -- k chislu tekh, dli︠a︡ kogo byla blizka i nesomnenna, govori︠a︡ ego sobstvennymi slovami, "volnui︠u︡shchai︠a︡ ubeditelʹnostʹ" mysli velikogo filosofa, A. Lazarev okazalsi︠a︡ fakticheski vne issledovatelʹskogo (...) i chitatelʹskogo vnimanii︠a︡. Dannai︠a︡ kniga i︠a︡vli︠a︡etsi︠a︡, po sushchestvu, pervym opytom privlechʹ interes k ego lichnosti i trudam. (shrink)